ABSTRACT
The Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) Cyber Security for Energy Delivery Systems (CSEDS) industry led program (DE-FOA-0000359) entitled "Innovation for Increasing Cyber Security for Energy Delivery Systems (12CSEDS)," awarded a contract to Sypris Electronics LLC to develop a Cryptographic Key Management System for the smart grid (Scalable Key Management Solutions for Critical Infrastructure Protection). Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sypris Electronics, LLC as a result of that award entered into a CRADA between ORNL and Sypris Electronics, LLC. ORNL provided its Cyber Security Econometrics System (CSES) as a tool to be modified and used as a metric to address risks and vulnerabilities in the management of cryptographic keys within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) domain of the electric sector. ORNL concentrated our analysis on the AMI domain of which the National Electric Sector Cyber security Organization Resource (NESCOR) Working Group 1 (WG1) has documented 29 failure scenarios. The computational infrastructure of this metric involves system stakeholders, security requirements, system components and security threats. To compute this metric, we estimated the stakes that each stakeholder associates with each security requirement, as well as stochastic matrices that represent the probability of a threat to cause a component failure and the probability of a component failure to cause a security requirement violation. We applied this model to estimate the security of the AMI, by leveraging the recently established National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628 guidelines for smart grid security and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 63351, Part 9 to identify the life cycle for cryptographic key management, resulting in a vector that assigned to each stakeholder an estimate of their average loss in terms of dollars per day of system operation. To further address probabilities of threats, information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. The strategy for the game was developed by analyzing five electric sector representative failure scenarios contained in the AMI functional domain from NESCOR WG1. From these five selected scenarios, we characterized them into three specific threat categories affecting confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrated how to model the AMI functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the AMI network with respect to CIA.
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

SCALABLE KEY MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Sypris' Smart Grid Security solution was awarded a contract to provide the Energy Sector with a Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS) that leverages the best practices of fielded DoD key management systems to protect high value data, and command and control information, while also providing the capability to quickly recover from a cryptographic key compromise situation or to fend off cyber-attack by use of an autonomous key distribution scheme. This scalable key management solution was design to provide generation, distribution, and revocation of keys to allow the utilities to manage and distribute cryptographic keys to provide secure communication flows between and within the Smart Grid domains.
This Cryptographic Key Management System will allow the utilities to compartmentalize the secure communications (i.e., use different keys for different locations or types of devices) into groups to isolate high value Smart Grid devices to better manage the risk associated with a compromised key. For example, should a disclosure of a cryptographic key for a residential smart meter occur, devices in the Distribution, Transmission, and Bulk Generation domains remain secure. Utility Operations will have the capability to control the compartmentalization of the keyed network groups using CKMS based on their trade off assessment of less management overhead of group keys versus greater security achieved through compartmented Smart Grid devices.
Another key benefit of CKMS is the compartmentalization of key generation. By compartmentalizing the key generation capability at CKMS within the Utility Operations, the strength and validity of the key can be assured, while also leaving the processing power and entropy at a computer that can satisfy these requirements instead of at smaller devices that are situated within the network.
Autonomous secure key distribution within the network (across potentially unsecure communication links) is to be accomplished via a hybrid approach. Smart Grid devices will have a certificate (asymmetric) that includes a public and private key. CKMS will initiate a rekey of symmetric key through just a few affiliated Smart Grid devices. The Smart Grid devices will then automatically propagate the key to authorized peers, where the authorized peers will then automatically propagate to their authorized peers, and so on. Smart Grid devices that are no longer considered authorized will not receive the new symmetric key; and therefore, be keyed out of the network.
BENEFITS TO THE FUNDING DOE OFFICE'S MISSION
The Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) Cyber Security for Energy Delivery Systems (CSEDS) has established partnerships over the past several years with industry, government, national laboratories and universities to advance and secure the energy system technologies. The prevailing theme that has surfaced repeatedly is that critical energy infrastructures are vulnerable to cyber-attack, with potential consequences including significant interruption of economic activity or, even, to catastrophic loss of life. To take the necessary steps to remedy these vulnerabilities, the CSEDS program is developing tools and algorithms (herein referred to as technologies) to reduce the risk of energy disruptions due to cyber-attacks on control systems.
The CSES was originally sponsored with ORNL internal funding. 
SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION OF THE CKMS FOR EDS
Task Description
ORNL, under DOE authorization, provided technical support to Sypris Electronics in assessing scientific and technological issues as they relate to DE-FOA-0000359 "Innovation for Increasing Cyber Security for Energy Delivery Systems (I2CSEDS), Topic Area 2 -Centralized (Compartmentalized) Cryptographic Key Management" in the areas of development, testing and evaluation of risks and vulnerabilities and to assess future concepts in the subject domain with respect to technical and operational procedures in key management including key generation, key distribution, and key maintenance.
Problem Addressed
The DOE (including DHS) facilitated the development of the Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector. The Roadmap synthesizes expert input from the control systems community, including owners and operators, commercial vendors, national laboratories, industry associations, and government agencies, to outline a coherent plan for improving cyber security in the energy sector. The plan provided by the Roadmap presents a vision and supporting framework of goals and milestones for protecting control systems over the period of [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] . Specifically the Roadmap's Vision for Securing Control Systems in the Energy Sector is, by 2015 (time period extended to 2020), § control systems for critical * http://energy.gov/oe/office-electricity-delivery-and-energy-reliability † https://www.fedconnect.net/fedconnect/?doc=DE-FOA-0000359&agency=DOE, http://www.netl.doe.gov/business/solicitations/fy10#00359 ‡ https://www.sypriselectronics.com/information-security/cyber-security-solutions/smart-grid-security/ § http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity Roadmap_finalweb.pdf, Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity, September 2011, Energy Sector Control Systems Working group, page 22. applications will be designed, installed, operated, and maintained to survive an intentional cyber assault with no loss of critical function. This effort overall targets the milestone: "Widespread implementation of methods for secure communication between remote access devices and control centers that are scalable and cost-effective to deploy." ** To a lesser extent, the effort addresses the milestone: "Make available security test harness for evaluating next generation architectures and individual components." † †
Background
The Cyber Security for Energy Delivery Systems (CSEDS) program has established partnerships over the past several years with industry, government, national laboratories and universities to advance and secure the energy system technologies. The prevailing theme that has surfaced repeatedly is that critical energy infrastructures are vulnerable to cyber-attack, with potential consequences including significant interruption of economic activity or, even, to catastrophic loss of life. To take the necessary steps to remedy these vulnerabilities, the CSEDS program desires to develop tools and algorithms (herein referred to as technologies) to reduce the risk of energy disruptions due to cyber-attacks on control systems.
Scope and Technical Approach
CKMS objectives were to develop and demonstrate technology for the secure management of cryptographic keys within the energy-sector infrastructure. Cryptographic keys must be securely exchanged, then held and protected on either end of a communications link. This is currently challenging for a utility with numerous substations that must secure the intelligent devices that comprise complex control systems. This challenge is magnified by the necessity of cryptographic key distribution among the millions of intelligent meters that comprise the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) being implemented as part of the National Smart Grid initiative. Without a means for secure cryptographic key management no cryptographic solution can be widely deployed to protect the energy-sector infrastructure from cyber-attack.
ORNL provided technical support to Sypris Electronics during this project to ensure critical risk assessment and testing of products/prototypes developed during the course of the performance period including future concepts in the EDS with respect to performance, risks, economics and operations. The lack of sound relevant and practical security metrics is severely hampering progress in the assessing and countering cyber threats, and ultimately protecting critical research, technology and infrastructure. On this basis ORNL:  Tested and evaluated the key generation process and will recommend mitigating solutions for any recognized key-based threats.  Tested and evaluated the security and usability of the proposed distribution methodology and suggest changes or mitigating techniques that can address any identified issues.  Tested and evaluated key maintenance as it relates to those keys already deployed. We identified three main challenges in key maintenance: revocation, redistribution of a new key, and leaked key recovery.
There will be instances where a key is compromised. Key revocation must be done without a malicious adversary interfering in the revocation of the compromised key, and this process should be designed to limit a leaked key's damage. After revocation, redistribution of the new key must be secure and reliable. ORNL:  Tested and evaluated the security and reliability of key maintenance within the key management system. ** Ibid, page 25. † † Ibid, page 63.
ORNL conducted a phased approach. Our past and current research in cyber security modeling, testing and evaluation had addressed several key elements that are critical for the proposed research including development, modeling and testing of algorithms and products/prototypes by other members of the team with respect to cryptographic key management.
During Phase I, the team developed and demonstrated initial technologies for the secure management of risks and vulnerabilities of cryptographic keys within the energy-sector infrastructure. ORNL identified and assessed the risks associated with candidate solutions.
During Phase II, ORNL implemented risk mitigating protocols and procedures to reflect the advances made by the Sypris Electronics team.
During Phase III, ORNL further refined the protocols, procedures, and prototypes and expanded the evaluation risk management tasks to reflect the advances made by the Sypris Electronics team.
TECHNICAL DISCUSSION OF WORK PERFORMED
The Cyber Security Econometrics System, or CSES, is a cybernomics tool for determining Mean Failure Cost (MFC), which has been demonstrated in the cyber security domain (for example, a failure is assumed to be the result of a malicious action). The MFC is a vector that assigns to each system stakeholder the statistical mean of the random variable that represents the loss sustained by that stakeholder as a result of possible security failures. It provides goals and milestones for protecting control systems, and has been applied using the National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency of Internal Reports (NISTIR) 7628 as a basis. This provides a comprehensive basis for choosing courses of action with highest risk reduction return on investment, quantifies security for comparison of architectures for subject domains of interest, and gives a rigorous methodology/tool combining root cause and impact analysis for managing risk to a degree commensurate with a stakeholder's potential losses. It is a system that provides a quantitative indication of reliability, performance and/or safety of a system that accounts for the criticality of each requirement as a function of one or more stakeholders' interests in the requirement.
The CSES has the following advantages: It accounts for variances existing among different stakeholders of the same system; for a given stakeholder, it accounts for variance among stakes attached to meeting each requirement; and for a given specification, (such as combination of commercial hardware/software), it accounts for variance that may exist among levels of verification and validation (certification, for example), performed on various components of said specification (certification activity may produce higher levels of assurance across different components of specification than others).
An effective security metric should identify and measure properties necessary for decision making, be measurable in a quantitative and repeatable way, be supported by a system or process capable of accurate and repeatable measurement, and be independently verifiable via an outside datum or reference. In addition, it could be inexpensive, in terms of time and cost, to gather and determine, it can be independently refereed or audited (in terms of compliance, accreditation and certification), and it could be scalable between individual devices and computers within an enterprise network. The Mean Failure Cost fills most of these requirements.
The CSES uses the MFC rather than the Mean-Time-To-Failure (MTTF). This is because the MTTF ignores variance in stakes among stakeholders, fails to recognize that different components have different stakes, even for same stakeholder, and fails to recognize validation and verification actions have different impacts with respect to different components of specification. The MFC, however, reveals how much each stakeholder stands to lose from mission value due to lack of security and allows an analyst to estimate the security of a system in terms of the loss each stakeholder stands to sustain in the event of system breakdowns. The CSES uses risk considerations to balance information, assurance, discipline, and flexibility, and to answer other "how much is enough" questions.
The lack of sound and practical security metrics has severely hampered progress in the development of secure systems, and the large number of potential threats and corresponding vulnerabilities that lurk in an information system represent a significant risk to any enterprise due to potential exploitation. This magnifies the need to create more diverse strategies and mechanisms.
The CSES was used to design, implement and control a complex system, and it triggers an alarm when the MFC for a particular stakeholder rises above acceptable levels. The CSES helped to illuminate information technology and industrial control systems policy decisions by identifying quantitative and qualitative sources of cost and value associated with candidate decisions. 
SUBJECT INVENTIONS (AS DEFINED IN THE CRADA)
PATENTS PENDING (DURING CRADA PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE -SOLELY
PATENTS PENDING (BROUGHT TO CRADA BY ORNL)
 "Cyberspace Security System," R. 
COPYRIGHT SOFTWARE (BROUGHT TO CRADA BY ORNL)
 R. K. Abercrombie, F. T. Sheldon, A. Mili, and A. Ben Aissa, "Cyber Security Econometrics System (CSES)" submitted December 10, 2010. 
CONCLUSIONS
The Cyber Security Econometrics System, or CSES, is a cybernomics tool for determining Mean Failure Cost (MFC), which has been demonstrated in the cyber security domain (for example, a failure is assumed to be the result of a malicious action). The MFC is a vector that assigns to each system stakeholder the statistical mean of the random variable that represents the loss sustained by that stakeholder as a result of possible security failures. It provides goals and milestones for protecting control systems, and has been applied using the NISTIR 7628 as a basis. This provides a comprehensive basis for choosing courses of action with highest risk reduction return on investment, quantifies security for comparison of architectures for subject domains of interest, and gives a rigorous methodology/tool combining root cause and impact analysis for managing risk to a degree commensurate with a stakeholder's potential losses. It is a system that provides a quantitative indication of reliability, performance and/or safety of a system that accounts for the criticality of each requirement as a function of one or more stakeholders' interests in the requirement.
The CSES uses the MFC rather than the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF). This is because the MTTF ignores variance in stakes among stakeholders, fails to recognize that different components have different stakes, even for same stakeholder, and fails to recognize validation and verification actions have different impacts with respect to different components of specification. The MFC, however, reveals how much each stakeholder stands to lose from mission value due to lack of security and allows an analyst to estimate the security of a system in terms of the loss each stakeholder stands to sustain in the event of system breakdowns. The CSES uses risk considerations to balance information, assurance, discipline, and flexibility, and to answer other "how much is enough" questions.
The CSES may be used to design, implement and control a complex system, and it triggers an alarm when the MFC for a particular stakeholder rises above acceptable levels. The CSES will help to illuminate information technology policy decisions by identifying quantitative and qualitative sources of cost and value associated with candidate decisions.
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE
Information security (IS) continues to evolve in response to disruptive changes with a persistent focus on information-centric controls. A healthy debate is needed to address balancing endpoint and network protection, with a goal of improved enterprise / business risk management. IS analysis can be performed using game theory implemented as dynamic simulations of ABMs. Such simulations can be verified against the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. We've concentrated our analysis on the AMI domain of which the NESCOR WG1 has currently documented 29 failure scenarios [1] . The strategy for the game was developed by selecting/analyzing five representative failure scenarios of the twenty-nine. We classified each of the five into one or more of three specific threats that may affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the system. Analysis using our ABM theoretic simulation [2] demonstrated that the AMI functional domain was simply and accurately modeled, the game theoretic rules were decomposed and analyzed as to their respective impacts (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) on the AMI network [3] .
When considering the cost of mitigations as they address either some of the most pernicious or the most likely of threats we need quantitative indications of reliability, performance, and/or safety/security (aka resiliency). The CSES approach accounts for (i.e., by deriving MFC) the criticality of each requirement as a function of one or more stakeholders' interest in that requirement, the underlying infrastructure (component-by-component) and an estimate of the likelihood of threats (combined with an existing vulnerability) emerging. By using the AD-ABS approach ( Fig. 1) we hope to establish a methodology for discovering insights through sensitivity analysis (perhaps as an approximation of the vertex cover problem) the set of paths of least resistance to disrupting/failing a mission requirement [4] . In this way, we can have higher confidence and precision for estimates of threat emergence probability. Then, combined with the results from CSES, we plan to develop a comprehensive bottom line basis for asset owners to decide in what and how much to invest, choosing courses of actions that reduce the most risks for the lowest cost.
Increasing Reliance on Advanced Technology
Increasing reliance on smart grid advanced technology capabilities and the worsening threat environment mean that asset owners are under pressure to invest more in information/cyber security.
A challenge is that the choices are hard: money is tight, objectives are not clear, and there are many relevant experts and stakeholders. A significant proportion of the research in security economics is about helping people and organizations make better security investment and policy decisions. Yet there is no clear guidance or method that helps those asset owners understand the cost of implementing security mitigations (i.e., pricing), nor a clear basis for return on investment (ROI). One question that is coming up more and more is the impact of methods (using economic/ cost models) that are based on Cost/ROI/MFC (mean failure cost) in helping decision makers choose from alternative courses of action and investments.
The opportunity: The smart grid (energy delivery system) provides a basis for looking at a realistic security problem and it's associated (information/cyber and physical) infrastructure toward encompassing the broad range of different factions included as justifications for the decisions that such stakeholders must make. The security professional is an important and influential stakeholder in the organization's decision-making process and arguably has a more complete understanding of the problem. They also may be more suitable for persuading a broader business audience in regards to hardening the critical infrastructure and potentially avoiding costly calamities.
The theoretical foundation: Cases similar to the one presented above can feed important information for adjusting assumptions and techniques in theoretical models evaluating more general economic mechanisms. These mechanisms, in turn, can be applied to improve and validate metrics and risk analysis for concrete situations. 
